This paper presents two types of digital signature schemes combinely that are blind signature and proxy signature. In the proxy blind signature scheme, a signer other than the original signer signs the document as the agent of the original signer not knowing the meaning of the message. In this paper, an enhanced proxy blind signature is proposed, in which a time stamp approach is added to the proxy blind signature scheme which is based upon the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
INTRODUCTION
Blind signature was first introduced by David Chaum [1] in 1983 in which the signer signs the message but he/she is ignorant about the contents of the message. Blind signature schemes are widely used in such applications where the privacy of the sender is important e.g. e-vote, e-cash, etc. Later, in 1996 Mambo et al [2] , by analyzing the concept of seal in our day to day life introduced the proxy signature scheme. In proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates his power to the proxy signer and the proxy signer signs the message or document as the agent of the original signer. By applying both blind signature and proxy signature schemes concurrently Lin and Jan in 2000, proposed a new digital signature scheme that is proxy blind signature scheme.
The proxy blind signature should meet the following security requirements:
No one other than the designated proxy signer can produce a valid proxy blind signature.
The proxy blind signature must be differentiable from the normal signature.
The original signer and the proxy signer cannot refuse their signatures against anyone.


Identifiabiability:
Anyone can find out the identification of the corresponding original signer and proxy signer from the signature.
 Verifiability:
The verifier should be able to examine the proxy signature.

Prevention of misuse:
The proxy key pair is used only for generating the proxy signature.
During the verification of the signature the signer cannot relate the message and the generated blind signature. 
RELATED WORK
PROPOSED WORK
In this section, we propose a new efficient and secured proxy blind signature scheme. The scheme is divided into following five stages 
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As, the signed message and sends it to the receiver R.
Signature Extraction
After receiving s' from B, the receiver R computes, s*= g u+s' mod q (10) thus, the proxy blind signature on m becomes finally (m, m w , s*, e).
Verification
Verifier can verify the proxy blind signature by checking whether ( * s the original signer must find a solution to the above equation which is a discrete logarithm problem. Thus, the original signer fails to forge a signature.
(ii) The receiver cannot forge the signature after receiving (m, m w , s*,e) on message m. when a receiver tries to forge a signature (m', s*, e') for message m', he/she must verify that the equation given below is correct. This cannot hold true, as e ≠ e'. Thus the receiver fails.
(iii) The proxy linkability holds if there is a conjuction between (t, e*, s') and (m, m w , s*, e). t is only in equation (6) and relate to e through equation (7). Proxy signer cannot find out the value of it as it is masked by two random numbers u and v. Hence, the proposed scheme satisfies the unlinkability property.
(iv) As the proxy blind signature (m, m w , s*, e) on the message m, contains m w (message warrant) any one can easily differentiate between the proxy blind signature and normal signature. Hence, it satisfies the distinguishability property.
(v) From the warrant m w , anyone can mark original signer and proxy signer. On the other hand, as the verification equation contains the public key of the proxy signer and original signer one can identify them. Hence, it satisfies the identifiability property.
(vi) The original signer cannot get the proxy signer's secret key, and similarly the proxy signer cannot get the original signer's secret key. So, one cannot sign on behalf of another. Hence, it satisfies the non repudiation property.
(vii) Due to the inclusion of the original signer and proxy signer identity information, message type to be signed by the proxy signer, delegation period, etc. in the warrant itself the proposed scheme is capable of preventing proxy key pair misuse.
(viii) Verification:
The proposed scheme satisfies the property of verifiability. Let M and E denote computational load for multiplication and exponentiation respectively. The computational load for addition is omitted due to the high performance. The proposed scheme is also efficient as other schemes in addition it guarantees that the signing is done within the delegation period.
CONCLUSION
During the verification of a proxy blind signature scheme the verifier cannot know whether signing (done by proxy signer) is within the delegation period or not. Proxy signer can make fool to the verifier by signing the message or document after the delegation period is over as there is no such provision to record the timestamp during the proxy signing phase. In the proposed scheme verifier can verify that the proxy signature was signed during a valid delegation period and it satisfies all the security requirements.
